[I] attempt in this thesis to explain not only the question of the material causes, but also the mind cast of the Parisian crowd in 1792. Enough has been written on the social origins of the Revolution to provide a good picture of its material causes. Such unfair conditions as then existed, i.e., the financial burden of the general population which resulted in hunger and deprivation for many, would have driven anyone to extremes. Yet, that explanation fails to answer three very important points. 1) Why did the killing expand beyond the original mandate to include the executions of obviously innocent people? 2) Why did many who were of a like-mind fail to join in? And 3), how did anger and frustration become focused on a particular assortment of people? For the answer to those questions we must turn to the ongoing research in the area of social-psychology; particularly where it concerns human behavior and personality....

This paper starts with a narrative background history which includes primary documents which support the incrimination of influential men such as [Georges Jacques] Danton, [Jean-Paul] Marat, [Louis-Marie Stanislas] Fréron, and others. It moves on to a discussion of the social causes for crowd aggression in section II, providing a look at the very real material origin of the uprising in question. Section III allows us to examine the historical argument between those such as [Georges] Lefebvre - who held that individuals do not become entirely consumed by crowd mentality, but continue to behave as they would if not involved in a collective situation - and others who argue in favor of a collective mentality. I conclude in this section that Lefebvre was working without the benefit of the most current research (which was accumulated during World War II, but not yet digested).

Roger W. Brown's 1956 study of collective behavior entitled Mass Phenomena is the source depended on here for sight into the psychological make-up of the crowd and those who participated in the September massacres. This work provides an in-depth analysis of individual personality in a collective environment. In the case of the crowd, Brown had determined that at least six types of personality are at work in a revolutionary group. Utilizing this description of personality types, a composite picture can be put together of the massacreurs of 1792. I devote sections IV and V to the role of personality in aggressive behavior; especially where they can be applied to incidents such as the prison massacres. Section V is devoted to Brown's concept of individual personalities which make up a crowd, while section IV concentrates on the personality of leaders. This is accomplished with the studies on human behavior completed by modern psychologists Harold Lasswell, Lewis Killian, and Eric Hoffer. It also utilizes the clinical experiments of men such as Stanley Milgram. These works help to identify the character traits of the revolutionary leaders involved in violent situations.... Using materials from these scholars, I attempt to explain how involvement of individual characters led to the popular uprising in September.

Section VI brings in the discussion of fear and panic as a motivating factor to violence....

We could not leave the discussion of human behavior behind without first discussing the father of psychology, Sigmund Freud. I devote most of section VII to the discussion of Freud's Oedipal complex as well as to [Ted] Gurr's argument against it. It is pertinent only because it addresses the issue of personality and motivation in leaders.

Section VIII brings us back to the days just before the assault of September. It explains the political motivation behind the massacres, and also the attitudes of the sans-culottes. It centers more on the conflict between the Commune and the National Assembly than on the question of [Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Duke of] Brunswick's invasion; yet, that too is addressed.

The paper concludes with a quick review of the chaptes and a final analysis. In the end, I generally concur with [George] Rudé's conclusion concerning the rational motivation of the crowd. Where I take exception to this view concerns the extremes of crowd behavior such as the killing of innocent adults and harmless children. An act such as this can be considered irrational. I also conclude that powerful men and influential leaders played a role in bringing this slaughter about. I do not claim, however, that they are the only ones to ever have done so....